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Evaluating the Success of Urban Success Stories
Harold L. Wolman, Coit Cook Ford III and Edward Hill

Summary. Arresting and reversing the condition of urban distress in America's cities represents
one of the most challenging and perplexing problems confronting policy-makers. Indeed, urban
distress in American cities has proved to be a stubborn and largely intractable phenomenon
during the past two decades. Nevertheless, a number of cities that were experiencing distress at
the beginning of the 1980s are now being acclaimed as 'urban success stories' or 'revitalised'
cities. We evaluate the performance, between 1980 and 1990, of these supposedly 'revitalised'
cities on objective indicators of the economic well-being of their residents and compare their
performance to that other cities that were equally distressed in 1980. We conclude that with the
exception of Atlanta, Baltimore and Boston, the purportedly 'revitalised' cities performed no
better with respect to change in the economic well-being of their residents than did other cities
that were equally distressed in 198~nd in many cases performed worse.

The condition of America's distressed urban
areas represents one of the most serious and
vexing problems facing the nation. Urban
economic distress has been both persistent
and highly resistant to policy solutions (see
Bradbury et al., 1982). Yet, in the face of
these problems, it is widely acknowledged
that there have been examples of urban successes. Both popular and academic journals
have heralded the revitalisation of cities such
as Baltimore, Pittsburgh and, more recently,
Cleveland. 1 Such success stories have naturally attracted the attention and interest of
public officials and community leaders in
distressed cities that are desperately seeking
solutions to their own problems. Indeed, delegations from distressed cities are frequent

visitors to these 'successful' cities, hoping to
learn from them and to emulate their success.
Unfortunately, these visitors-and others
who herald these 'urban success stories'are frequently quite unclear about the nature
of these successes and the benefits they produce.
There are obviously many different ways
of defining and measuring 'success'. Success
may be viewed in terms of improvement in a
variety of economic, social and physical conditions such as increased business investment, physical redevelopment, reduction in
crime and infant mortality rates, increases in
educational achievement, etc. In this paper,
our concern is with improvement in the economic well-being of area residents, a concern
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widely held to be of substantial importance.
Our objective is to determine whether cities
that are perceived to have undergone economic revitalisation have, at the same time,
experienced improvement in the economic
well-being of their residents. We pursue this
objective by comparing changes in the economic well-being of residents in cities perceived to have undergone successful urban
revitalisation to changes in the economic
well-being of residents in cities that were
similar to them prior to their supposed revitalisation. This will permit us to assess the
extent to which 'urban success stories' are
myth or reality, at least with respect to the
economic well-being of their residents.
As Ladd and Yinger (1989) observe, urban
revitalisation can benefit cities by improving
(1) their economic base (increasing employment and output in the city);
(2) their fiscal condition; or
(3) the well-being of their residents.
Well-being is a multi-faceted construct that
includes economic, social and psychological
components (see Wolman and Goldsmith,
1992, for a discussion of the concept of
residential well-being). In this article, our
concern is the extent to which the perceived
'urban success stories' have actually improved the economic well-being of their residents relative to that of residents of other
cities that were similar to them, prior to
their supposed revitalisation, in degree of
distress. We do not address the relationship
between perceived success and other objective success measures such as those previously discussed, although, we believe such
relationships worthy of exploration, and invite others to apply our methodology to that
end. Instead, we are concerned with whether
public perceptions of success are related to
reality, at least with respect to improvements
in the economic well-being of city residents.
Furthermore, we take these perceptions as
given-i.e. we are not concerned with the
causes of these perceptions or why they
arise, but with whether these perceptions of
success accord with reality. Such public per-

ceptions, whatever their origins, are important, for they condition and influence the
actions of policy-makers and community decision-makers, often in quite profound ways.
The question of whether urban revitalisation has actually benefited city residents has
been widely discussed and debated in the
literature (see, for example, the exchange
between Levine (1987a, 1987b) and Berkowitz (1987), the various contributors in Squires
(1989), Fainstein et al. (1986), Clavel
(1986), Riposa and Andranovich (1988),
Barnekov et al. (1989) and Brownhill (1990).
However, it has not been the subject of systematic empirical research across a range of
cities.
In order to pursue our objective we make
use of a form of natural experiment. First, we
identify cities that were distressed in 1980,
but have (purportedly) successfully revitalised since that time. We then compare the
extent to which the economic well-being of
the residents of these perceived 'successful'
cities has improved from 1980 to 1990, with
that of the residents of cities which were
similarly distressed in 1980 but are not perceived to have undergone successful revitalisation. We call the latter the perceived
'unsuccessful cities'. Finally, we identify
those distressed cities in 1980 that, in fact,
experienced the greatest increase in resident
economic well-being during the past decade.
Methodology

The first step was to identify the 'urban
success stories' -that is, cities that were distressed in 1980, but are widely believed to
have successfully revitalised over the course
of the past decade. Rather than relying on
impressions from the media, we decided to
consult expert opinion in a systematic manner. Specifically, we asked a set of highly
informed observers to identify those cities
that had been distressed in 1980, but had
undergone successful revitalisation by the
end of the decade.
We began by identifying a set of cities that
were distressed according to objective criteria in 1980. The first step involved devel-
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oping an index of urban distress. There is a
substantial literature on what constitutes urban distress. Bradbury et al. (1982) distinguish between descriptive decline, which
they measure through changes in population
and employment, and functional distress,
which they measure through changes in variables such as the unemployment rate, per
capita income, the incidence of poverty and
the rate of violent crime. Franklin James
(1990) develops a 'city distress index' that
combines resident needs, as measured by city
poverty rate, unemployment rate and per capita income growth, and population change.
Other measures abound (see, for example,
Nathan and Adams (1976), Cuciti (1978) and
Fossett and Nathan (1981). For reviews of
this literature, see James (1990) and Sternlieb
(1980).
Our urban distress index combines both
descriptive and functional indicators and is
quite similar to that of James (1990). We
utilised five indicators:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the 1980 unemployment rate;
the 1980 poverty rate (persons);
1980 median household income
percentage change between 1970 and
1980 in per capita income; and
(5) percentage change between 1970 and
1980 in population
A distribution of standard scores was created
for each of the individual indicators. The
indicators were standardised by converting
them to n scores. 2 The standardised scores
for each city were then summed across all
five indicators (thus weighting each of the
indicators equally) to create a cumulative
index of urban health (see AppendixV The
bottom third of the cities in this distribution
were designated as 'distressed' (n =50).
We then solicited the opinions of a set of
experts, sending them a survey letter that
included the list of the 50 most distressed
cities in 1980, and asking them to select up
to 10 that had experienced the strongest
'economic turnaround or urban revitalisation' by the end of the decade. The survey
was sent to members of the editorial boards
of the leading American academic journals

concerned with urban affairs and economic
development (Urban Affairs Quarterly, Journal of Urban Affairs and Economic Development Quarterly), and to members of the
Executive Boards of two leading economic
development practitioner organisations, the
American Economic Development Council
(AEDC) and the Council on Urban Economic Development (CUED). Our response
rate was 47.8 per cent (76 responses from
159 sampled).
We deemed 'successfully revitalised'
those cities (n = 12) that were named by 20
per cent or more of the respondents, and
'most successfully revitalised' those cities
(n = 6) that were named by 40 per cent or
more of the respondents (Table 1). In order
to ensure that the successfully revitalised
cities did not differ from the other distressed
cities as of 1980 (i.e. they were both part of
the same distressed population), we compared the means of the two groups of cities
using a difference of means test, and found
no statistically significant difference between
them.
Again, we emphasise that this process
yielded only perceptions, albeit of reasonably informed people, and that this is what it
was designed to do. We did not use it as a
means of determining which cities had, in
fact, successfully undergone urban revitalisation in objective terms, and we do not argue
that perceptions accord with reality. We also
do not know how these perceptions were
formed. Our intent was to capture perceptions, based on what our informed respondents carried around in their minds, rather
than to capture objective reality based on
data.
Comparisons of the performance of the
different groups of cities between 1980 and
1990 were then made on a series of indicators of the economic well-being of residents.
We focus on the economic well-being of
residents because the ultimate benefit of spatial revitalisation must be measured in terms
of whether or not people (rather than tracts of
land) are better off, and economic benefits
are nearly universally recognised as being of
substantial importance.
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Table 1. The 'successfully revitalised' cities, I980-90

Central city
Pittsburgh
Baltimore
Atlanta
Cleveland
Cincinnati
Louisville
Miami
Boston
Chicago
Birmingham
Buffalo
Norfolk

State
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Georgia
Ohio
Ohio
Kentucky
Florida
Massachusetts
Illinois
Alabama
New York
Virginia

Count

Response (%)

63
49
40
37
33
3I
23
22
22
18
I8
I6

82.9
64.5

52.6
48.7
43.4
40.8
30.3
28.9
28.9
23.7
23.7
21.1
54 I
76
7.I2

Total count
Total respondents
Average responses
Responses
American Economic Development Council
Council on Urban Economic Development
Journal of Urban Affairs
Economic Development Quarterly
Urban Affairs Quarterly
Survey organizations

Duplicate Membership (respondents)
Total respondents
Total number surveyed
Survey response rate (%)

(Number)
I3
I8
II
22
I4
2

76
I 59

47.8

Note: The 'successfully revitalised' cities were selected by respondents from
a set of 50 cities that were experiencing distress in I980 according to their
scores on an index of urban health. (See Appendix note for a description of
the methodology.)

How should economic well-being be conceptualised and operationalised? Conceptually, we define economic well-being of area
residents to consist of the ability to purchase
goods and services (income), the distribution
of income among residents, and the ability to
participate effectively in area labour markets
(as a component of economic well-being itself, irrespective of the income such participation might produce). Since our concern is
with change in economic well-being, operationally we seek measures of change in real
income, in the distribution of income, and in
the labour force status of area residents.
Three measures of change in income and
the distribution of income were used: (1)

percentage change in median household income and (2) percentage change in per capita
income as measures of change in income,
and (3) percentage point change in the rate of
persons below the poverty line as a measure
of distribution. We expect that 'successfully
revitalised' cities will have experienced
larger increases in both median household
and per capita income and greater reductions
in the rate of poverty than will the unrevitalised or 'unsuccessful' cities.
To operationalise the labour force status of
area residents, we used two measures that are
common in the labour economics literature:
the percentage point change in the unemployment rate and the percentage point
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Table 2. Comparative performance of perceived `successfully revitalised' and perceived `unsuccessful'
cities, 1980-90

Indicator
Unemployment rate (percentage point change)
Poverty rate (percentage point change)
Labour force participation (percentage point change)
Median household income (percentage change)
Per capita income (percentage change)
Index of economic well-being (n scores)

Successful
(N= 12)
Mean

Unsuccessful
(N = 38)
Mean

1 .40
2 .53
2.78
73 .38
89 .36

1 .27
2 .91
2 .70
76 .78
87 .57

-0 .038

0.012

Test statistic
(critical :
- 1 .96, 1 .96)
-0 .347
0 .275
-0 .111
0 .390
-0.220
0 .043

Note : The index of well-being is the product of the summation of the standard scores for changes in five
indicators of resident economic well-being between 1980 and 1990 . These include : percentage point
change in the unemployment rate, the rate of persons below the poverty line and the labour force
participation rate ; as well as percentage change in median household income and per capita income . The
percentage point changes in the unemployment rate and the rate of persons below the poverty line are
adjusted (multiplied by negative one) so that a positive sign on all indicators connotes relative improvement
in economic well-being .

change in the labour force participation rate .
Employment-the possession of a job-is
seen as, in itself, an important component of
economic well-being . Lower unemployment
rates thus imply greater economic well-being
for area residents . We expect that 'successfully revitalised' cities will have experienced
a greater tightening of labour markets over
the decade relative to `unsuccessful' cities
and, consequently, reductions in unemployment rates relative to these cities . This expectation is consistent with Bartik's (1991)
work on state and local economic development policy .
Increases in labour force participation
reflect increased optimism on the part of area
residents about the prospects of gaining employment and thus, in our terms, an increase
in their economic well-being . Eberts and
Stone (1992) have conclusively shown that
local labour markets adjust to fluctuations in
the demand for labour by changing their
labour force participation rates . Thus, we
expect that if cities have truly revitalised,
then their labour force participation rates will
be higher than rates found in the unsuccessful cities .
We first compared the 12 `successfully
revitalised' cities with the 38 other cities that

were distressed in 1980, but were perceived
by our panel as not having undergone successful revitalisation over the decade . Next,
we compared the 6 `most successfully revitalised' cities to the 38 `unsuccessful' cities .
Findings
Did the distressed cities which were perceived by our experts to have successfully
revitalised during the past decade actually
perform better than the other distressed cities
in terms of our indicators of resident economic well-being? To answer this query, we
compared the means of the supposedly 'successfully revitalised' cities with the means of
the supposedly `unsuccessful' cities on each
of the five indicators . Since we were dealing
with two populations of cities rather than
samples (all cities in metropolitan areas of
250 000 or more that were distressed in
1980), differences found between the populations were real differences, not sampling error . Nevertheless, in order to determine
whether the observed differences were large
enough to be significant under more rigorous
statistical assumptions (i .e . if we considered
the cities as a sample of all possible distressed cities over a long period of time), we
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Table 3. Comparative perfonnance of perceived 'most successfully revitalised' and perceived
'unsuccessful' cities, 1980--90

Most
successful

Unsuccessful

(N=6)

(N= 38)

Test statistic
(critical:

Indicator

Mean

Mean

- 1.96, 1.96)

Unemployment rate (percentage point change)
Poverty rate (percentage point change)
Labour force participation (percentage point change)
Median household income (percentage change)
Per capita income (percentage change)

1.30
3.03
2.47
69.10
91.35

1.27
2.91
2.70
76.78
87.57

Index of economic well-being (n scores)

-0.222

0.012

-0.058
-0.055
0.296
0.800
-0.350
0.228

Test criterion: p = 0.05, Z probability distribution

applied a difference of means test. In doing
so, we found no statistically significant difference for any of the indicators (see
Table 2).
Indeed, the 'successfully revitalised' cities
were actually outperformed by the 'unsuccessful' cities on some of our indicators. The
'unsuccessful' cities did better than the 'successful' cities in terms of the percentage
point change in the unemployment rate-the
rate increased in the 'successful' cities by
1.40 percentage points, while it increased by
1.27 percentage points in the 'unsuccessful'
cities. The 'unsuccessful' cities also saw
greater improvements in median income than
did the 'successful' cities (76.8 per cent in
nominal dollars compared to 73.4 per cent).
The 'successfully revitalised' cities did do
slightly better than the 'unsuccessful' cities
with respect to percentage change in per
capita income and percentage point change
in the poverty rate, but these differences
were slight and as noted, far short of statistical significance.
We next constructed an overall 'index of
economic well-being' as a summary measure
of the change in resident economic well-being from 1980 to 1990. The index was constructed by summing the standard scores of
the five indicators (percentage point change
in: the unemployment rate, labour force participation rate and the poverty rate and percentage change in median household income

and in per capita income). The 'unsuccessful'
cities actually had a slightly higher summary
index of resident economic well-being than
the 'successfully revitalised' cities (0.012
compared to - 0.038), although the differences were not statistically significant.
In order to provide a more stringent test,
we next compared the performance of the
six 'most successfully revitalised' citiesthose which 40 per cent or more of the
respondents had mentioned-with that of the
38 'unsuccessful' cities. Remarkably, the
'unsuccessful' cities outperformed the 'most
successfully revitalised' cities on all of the
five indicators of resident economic well-being (except change in per capita inco~e) and
on the summary index (0.012 compared to
- 0.222). Again, there were no statistically
significant differences between the two
groups of cities, either with respect to the
individual indicators or the summary index
of performance (see Table 3).
Since averages may hide important differences in individual city performance, we examined the individual means of the 6 'most
successfully revitalised' cities on each indicator of economic well-being by comparing
them to the means of the 38 'unsuccessful'
cities. It is clear from this analysis (see Table
4) that two of the perceived 'most successfully revitalised' cities-Atlanta and Baltimore-did perform considerably better than
the 'unsuccessful' cities. Baltimore per-
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Table 4. Individual city changes on the indicators of resident economic well-being, 'most successfully
revitalised' cities, 1980-90

City
Pittsburgh
Baltimore
Atlanta
Cleveland
Cincinnati
Louisville
Mean 'unsuccessful cities'

Percentage Percentage
change in point change
Percentage
median
in persons
point change
house
below the
unemployment income
poverty line

Percentage
point change
Percentage in the labour
change in
force
per capita participation
income
rate

2.2
0.1*
1.5
3.9
-0.4*
0.5*

54.7
87.7
97.2*
45.2
65.7
64.1

4.9
-1.0*
-0.2*
6.6
4.6
3.3

83.8
104.1 *
133.7*
60.5
82.5
83.5

1.5
3.7
4.1*
0.3
3.2
2.0

1.27

76.78

2.91

87.57

2.70

Note: The values for each city that are half standard deviation units beyond the mean of the 'unsuccessful
cities' (n = 38) for each indicator of resident economic well-being are marked with an asterisk.

formed better than the 'unsuccessful' cities
on each of the five indicators; and on three of
these indicators (unemployment rate, poverty
rate and per capita income), Baltimore's
mean was at least half a standard deviation
better than the mean of the 'unsuccessful'
cities. Atlanta performed better than the
'unsuccessful' cities on four of the five indicators (all but change in unemployment rate);
and for each of these four indicators, Atlanta's mean was at least half a standard
deviation better than the mean of the 'unsuccessful' cities. However, Cleveland and Pittsburgh performed more poorly than the
'unsuccessful' cities on all five of the indicators (indeed, Cleveland was more than half a
standard deviation below the mean performance of the 'unsuccessful' cities on four of
the five indicators), while Louisville performed more poorly on four of the indicators
and Cincinnati on three.
We also examined separately the other six
cities comprising the set of 'successfully revitalised' cities. Of the six, only Boston
clearly outperformed the 'unsuccessful' cities, experiencing beneficial changes in the
economic well-being of their residents as
demonstrated by being half a standard deviation or more beyond the mean of the 'unsuccessful' cities on four of the five

indicators. Norfolk also outperformed the
'unsuccessful' cities on four of the five indicators, but on only one was it more than half
a standard deviation better than their mean.
The other four cities perceived to be 'successfully revitalised' (Miami, Chicago,
Birmingham and Buffalo) all performed
more poorly than the 'unsuccessful' cities on
at least three of the five indicators of economic well-being (see Table 5).
It is possible that our survey respondents
may have been focusing on metropolitan areas rather than central cities when they listed
urban areas that experienced 'the strongest
economic turnaround or urban revitalisation'.
It is also possible that the impact of urban
revitalisation may have exerted its most substantial economic effect on the residents of
the entire metropolitan area rather than
specifically on the residents of central cities,
with suburban residents benefiting most from
the increased economic viability of the central city. Accordingly, we repeated our analysis for the metropolitan areas of the
'successfully revitalised', 'most successfully
revitalised', and 'unsuccessful' cities.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to
gather labour force participation rate data on
a comparable metropolitan area basis for
both 1980 and 1990, so the metropolitan area
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Table 5. Individual city changes on the indicators of resident economic well-being, 'next most successfully
revitalised' cities, 1980-90

City
Miami
Boston
Chicago
Birmingham
Buffalo
Norfolk
Mean 'unsuccessful cities'

Percentage Percentage
change in point change
Percentage
median
in persons
point change
house
below the
poverty line
unemployment income
4.1
2.3
2.3
-1.7*
-0.6*
2.6

52.8
132.9*
71.9
60.6
59.4
88.4

6.7
-1.5*

1.27

76.78

Percentage
point change
Percentage in the labour
change in
force
per capita participation
income
rate

2.8
4.9
-1.4*

61.1
137.7*
84.5
74.2
76.2
90.5

0.0
6.4*
3.0
1.8
3.9
3.4

2.91

87.57

2.70

1.3

Note: The values for each city that are half standard deviation units beyond the mean of the 'unsuccessful
cities' (n = 38) for each indicator of resident economic well-being are marked with an asterisk.

index of economic well-being consisted of
four indicators rather than five. Nevertheless,
our findings were essentially the same as for
the previous analysis (see Table 6).
There were no statistically significant differences between the performance of the
metropolitan areas of the 'successfully revitalised' cities and the metropolitan areas of
the 'unsuccessful' cities. Indeed, the 'unsuccessful' metropolitan areas outperformed the
'successfully revitalised' metropolitan areas
on three of the four indicators, having somewhat greater percentage increases in both
median household and per capita income and
a greater decline in the unemployment rate
( - 1.69 percentage points compared to
- 1.03). The 'unsuccessful' areas also performed better on the summary index of resident economic well-being. We repeated the
analysis for the six metropolitan areas of the
'most successfully revitalised' cities with
much the same results (see Table 7).
Our analysis has convincingly shown that
the so-called urban success stories were, on
the whole, mythical-at least so far as the
economic condition of the residents is concerned. We can now consider the question of
which distressed cities did experience the
best performance with respect to our summary index of resident economic well-being
from 1980 to 1990. The n scores on the

summary indicator for all the 50 cities are
listed in order of performance (best to worst)
in Table 8. The index consists of the summation of the city n scores from each of the
five indicators (percentage point change in
unemployment rate, poverty rate and labour
force participation rate; and percentage
change in median household and per capita
income). By these criteria, the six best-performing cities over the period are, in order,
Wilmington, Paterson, Atlantic City, Jersey
City, Boston and New York. Clearly there is
a regional factor at work-for cities and their
metropolitan areas are likely to perform in
much the same manner as the region of
which they are a part, and the Mid-Atlantic
and New England regions performed very
well during the 1980s. Of the perceived
'most successfully revitalised' cities, Atlanta
ranks 12th, Baltimore 14th, Cincinnati 21st,
Louisville 30th, Pittsburgh 38th and Cleveland 44th.
Discussion

We have examined the cities that are perceived to be 'urban success stories' and
found that, taken as a group, they performed
no better with respect to change in the economic well-being of their residents-and in
many cases performed worse-than did other
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Table 6. Comparative performance of the metropolitan areas of perceived 'successfully revitalised' cities
to the metropolitan areas of perceived 'unsuccessful' cities, 1980-90

Most Successful Unsuccessful
(N= 12)

(N= 38)

Test statistic
(critical:

Mean

Mean

- 1.96, 1.96)

Unemployment rate (percentage point change)
Poverty rate (percentage point change)
Median house income (percentage change)
Per capita income (percentage change)

-1.03
0.37
76.93
98.84

-1.69
0.51
81.81
104.21

-1.36
0.21
0.73
0.87

Index of economic well-being (n scores)

-0.54

0.17

0.72

Indicator

cities that were equally distressed in 1980.
We did find that three of the cities reputed
to be successful-Atlanta, Baltimore and
Boston-performed considerably better than
the other distressed cities; they could
justifiably be termed 'urban success stories',
although, with the possible exception of
Boston, they were by no means the best
performers of the distressed cities.
How can we account for these findings,
and how do we interpret them? First, we
must state the obvious: we purposefully did
not define the terms 'economic turnaround'
or 'urban revitalisation' for our respondents,
and it is uncertain what criteria they were
using when they identified those cities that
had experienced the 'strongest economic
turnaround or urban revitalisation'. It is
clear, however, that improvement in the
economic well-being of the residents was not
the criterion by which urban revitalisation
was being measured, or, if it was, it was
badly misperceived.
If we were to define urban revitalisation in
objective terms (e.g. an increase in residential, commercial and industrial investment in
the city), it may be that some or all of these
cities did not undergo urban revitalisation at
all. Or, perhaps, these cities did experience
such revitalisation, but it did not produce an
improvement in the relative economic wellbeing of their residents. Instead, 'urban revitalisation' might have been manifested in
improvements in the city's economic base
(e.g. an increase in the number of jobs located in the city) or fiscal condition. Indeed,

it is possible that one or both of these conditions may have served as implicit criteria by
which our respondents identified cities which
had undergone economic turnaround or urban revitalisation.
In the end, of course, we do not know
what was in the minds of our respondents or
why they responded as they did. This is an
interesting subject, and one worthy of further
research. An initial hypothesis is that perception of downtown redevelopment efforts
greatly influences perception of urban success. (Physical development is frequently
viewed by planners and development professionals as the leading indicator, if not the
culmination, of revitalisation. See Frieden
and Sagalyn, 1989). If this hypothesis is
valid, then the cities that are perceived as
most revitalised will be those that experienced the most substantial improvement in
their central business districts, the most visible part of an area's image. Redevelopment
of the central business district in terms of
both new office buildings and the presence of
retail stores and boutiques, recreational opportunities and tourist attractions may drive
public perceptions of the well-being of the
entire urban area. However, if this hypothesis
is true, then it must be said that improved
downtown image did not translate, at least
immediately, into improvements in the economic well-being of residents, either in the
city or in the metropolitan area as a whole. 4
An interesting, though highly speculative
explanation, can also be constructed from the
data we have presented on the performance
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Table 7. Comparative performance of the metropolitan areas of perceived 'most successfully revitalised'
cities to the metropolitan areas of perceived 'unsuccessful' cities, 1980-90
(N= 12)

(N= 38)

Test statistic
(critical:

Mean

Mean

- 1.96, 1.96)

Unemployment rate (percentage point change)
Poverty rate (percentage point change)
Median house income (percentage change)
Per capita income (percentage change)

-1.28
0.48
73.00
99.13

-1.69
0.51
81.81
104.21

-0.83

Index of economic well-being (n scores)

-0.63

0.17

0.70

Most Successful Unsuccessful
Indicator

Test criterion: p

=

O.D3
1.02
0.71

0.05, Z probability distribution

of the 'most successfully revitalised' cttJ.es
relative to the 'unsuccessful' ones. First of
all, per capita income increased more in the
six 'most successfully revitalised' cities than
in the unsuccessful ones, but median household income increased more in the 38
'unsuccessful cities'. The only possible explanation for this is that household size declined more rapidly in the most successful
cities, which would be consistent with a relatively greater increase in young single individuals and childless couples (yuppies)
frequently associated with revitalisation of
downtown areas and gentrification. The
small, but greater increase, in the unemployment rate and poverty rate in the 'most successfully revitalised' cttJ.es would be
consistent with a worsening of the income
distribution and growing disparities between
the wealthy and the poor.

Summary and Conclusion
We begin by emphasising what we did find
and what we did not. Cities that have been
perceived as 'urban success stories' have not,
in fact, been successful, at least in so far as
improving the economic well-being of their
residents. The change in the economic wellbeing of residents of cities that are typified as
'urban success stories' between 1980 and
1990 did not differ from-and in some cases
was inferior to--change in the economic
well-being of residents of other cities that

were (like the 'urban success stories') distressed in 1980.
Our findings do not suggest that actual (as
opposed to perceived) urban revitalisation
might not lead to improvements in the economic well-being of residents, unless one
assumes (and we do not) that the correspondence between perceived and actual urban
revitalisation is exact. Our findings relate to
the common perceptions which drive policymakers (and urban experts as well) to evaluate city performance and learn from
'successes'. We argue that efforts to copy the
policies and development activities of these
'success stories' may well be misplaced, at
least if improving the economic well-being
of area residents is the goal that is being
pursued.
We have no data that relate to actual urban
revitalisation. It would indeed be useful to
identify which cities have actually achieved
urban revitalisation and to examine the effect
of revitalisation on economic well-being.
Such an effort would require a careful conceptual definition of urban revitalisation and
selection of a corresponding operational variable for which data could be collected.
Our work also raises interesting questions
about what urban experts, policy-makers and
others mean when they make use of the term
'urban revitalisation'. We view this as an
important question, since we believe that
mental constructs about the nature of a
phenomenon are important determinants of
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Table 8. Central city economic perfonnance on the index
of economic well-being, 1980-90 (emboldened cities are
those selected as 'successfully revitalised'.)
Central city

State

Wilmington
Paterson
Atlantic City
Jersey City
Boston
New York
New Haven
Newark
New Brunswick
Trenton
Bridgeport
Atlanta
Albany
Baltimore
Philadelphia
Reading
Scranton
Providence
Norfolk
York
Cincinnati
Utica
Birmingham
Springfield
Chicago
Syracuse
Buffalo
Binghamton
New Bedford
Louisville
Augusta
Macon
St. Louis
Hartford
Akron
Harrisburg
Rochester
Pittsburgh
Dayton
Huntington
Canton
New Orleans
Saginaw
Cleveland
Miami
Flint
Detroit
Johnstown
Gary
Youngstown

Delaware
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Jersey
Massachusetts
New York
Connecticut
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Jersey
Connecticut
Georgia
New York
Maryland
Pennsylvania
Pennsy1vania
Pennsy1vania
Rhode Island
Virginia
Pennsylvania
Ohio
New York
Alabama
Massachusetts
Illinois
New York
New York
New York
Massachusetts
Kentucky
Georgia
Georgia
Missouri
Massachusetts
Ohio
Pennsylvania
New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
West Virginia
Ohio
Louisiana
Michigan
Ohio
Florida
Michigan
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Indiana
Ohio

Index score

9.388
7.374
6.120
5.960
5.943
4.487
4.422
4.027
3.767
3.650
3.515
3.482
3.470
2.835
1.632
1.516
1.090
0.774
0.703
0.552
0.007
-0.064
-0.069
-0.140
-0.142
-0.166
-0.228
-0.297
-0.316
-0.334
-0.497
-0.661
-0.919
-0.936
- 1.194
- 1.250
- 1.335
-2.066
-2.184
-3.863
-4.236
-4.597
-5.253
-5.334
-5.758
-5.967
-5.967
-6.886
-7.001
-8.080

Note: See text for an explanation of the creation and
composition of this index.
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how policy-makers frame both problems and
solutions. 'Urban revitalisation', whatever it
is, has a highly positive valence; it is seen to
be a good thing, worthy of pursuit and emulation. But of what does this good thing
consist? Clearer understanding of what people mean by 'urban revitalisation' might also
lead to more critical thinking about which
aspects of it are indeed 'good' and which are
more problematic. This, too, is worthy of
additional research.
In future work, we intend to examine what
factors account for the performance of those
distressed cities that actually improved the
economic well-being of their residents. Two
important questions that arise are what factors accounted for their superior performance
and to what extent can that performance be
attributed to policy choices made by these
cities, rather than to regional and national
economic factors? Using the same data set
we also intend to examine the relative performance of central cities and their metropolitan areas and address the extent to which
central city economic performance affects
the performance of the city's suburbs and the
metropolitan area as a whole.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

The popular press has written extensively on
the subject of 'comeback cities' or 'urban
success stories', focusing largely on the
physical revitalisation of the downtown
cores. See, for example, "Spiffing up the
Urban Heritage" Time, 23 November 1987;
"When Cities Smile Again" The Economist,
16 January 1988; "The Rest of the Major
Cities" Fortune, 23 October 1989 and "You
Wanna Meet Here", Sales and Marketing
Management, November 1990.
N scores are conceptually equivalent to z
scores, but are distributed in standard deviation units from the median rather that the
mean. Thus, n scores have the advantage of
being less influenced by sample outliers in
the creation of a distribution of scores.
The signs on the standard scores of the unemployment rate and poverty rate were reversed (multiplied by negative one) in the
index, so that a positive score constituted an
improvement in economic condition.
Indeed, it would suggest that the downtown
development and increased activity, if it oc-

curred, involved redistribution of economic
activity from other parts of the metropolitan
area to downtown rather than an increase in
overall economic activity. However, even if
this hypothesis is true, we hasten to add that
we are not arguing that downtown development and enhancement of a city's image may
not have some beneficial effects in terms of
the residents' own image of their city and
consequent psychological improvements in
their quality of life, or indeed, in terms of
economic development and economic wellbeing. It may be true (it may not as well) that
any positive economic development gains
derived from a city's image enhancement
require a substantial lead time before investors of mobile capital respond. Baltimore,
Boston and Atlanta have, it is true, been
recognised as 'urban success stories' longer
that have Pittsburgh and Cleveland.
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Appendix. Central City Performance on the Index of Urban Health, 1980
Central city

State

Lexington-Fayette
San Jose
Anaheim
Houston
Bakersfield
Appleton
Tulsa
Wichita
Honolulu
Raleigh
Santa Rosa
Davenport
Aurora
Austin
Colorado Springs
Oklahoma City
Phoenix
Portsmouth
Charlotte
Santa Barbara
Nashville-Davidson
Modesto
Waukegan
Little Rock
Corpus-Christi
Dallas
Albuquerque
Las Vegas
Oxnard
Madison
Evansville
Charleston
Riverside
Des Moines
Omaha
Manchester
Baton Rouge

Kentucky
California
California
Texas
California
Wisconsin
Oklahoma
Kansas
Hawaii
North Carolina
California
Iowa
Illinois
Texas
Colorado
Oklahoma
Arizona
New Hampshire
North Carolina
California
Tennessee
California
Illinois
Arkansas
Texas
Texas
New Mexico
Nevada
California
Wisconsin
Indiana
West Virginia
California
Iowa
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Louisiana

Index score
8.236
7.948
7.191
6.678
6.326
6.299
5.894
5.719
5.713
5.705
5.664
5.525
4.893
4.890
4.877
4.676
4.675
4.625
4.622
4.078
3.957
3.890
3.822
3.717
3.610
3.483
3.416
3.281
3.226
3.198
3.140
2.966
2.946
2.832
2.824
2.815
2.804
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Appendix.-Continued.
Central city

State

Vallejo
San Diego
Shreveport
Ann Arbor
Chattanooga
Beaumont
Greensboro
Jacksonville
Denver
Fort Lauderdale
Joliet
Peoria
Fort Worth
Orlando
Melbourne
Tucson
West Palm Beach
Eugene
Duluth
Johnson City
Montgomery
Pensacola
Salinas
Indianapolis
Charleston
Mobile
McAllen
Portland
Fresno
Lakeland
Rockford
Columbus
Minneapolis
San Francisco
Fort Wayne
Allentown
San Antonio
Greenville
Kansas City
Lorain
Milwaukee
Seattle
Jackson
Spokane
Tampa
Sacramento
Los Angeles
Memphis

California
California
Louisiana
Michigan
Tennessee
Texas
North Carolina
Florida
Colorado
Florida
Illinois
Illinois
Texas
Florida
Florida
Arizona
Florida
Oregon
Minnesota
Tennessee
Alabama
Florida
California
Indiana
South Carolina
Alabama
Texas
Oregon
California
Florida
Illinois
Ohio
Minnesota
California
Indiana
Pennsylvania
Texas
South Carolina
Missouri
Ohio
Wisconsin
Washington
Mississippi
Washington
Florida
California
California
Tennessee

Lansing
Tacoma
Salt Lake City
Knoxville
Hamilton
Stockton
Washington

Michigan
Washington
Utah
Tennessee
Ohio
California
District of Columbia

Index score
2.741
2.658
2.639
2.545
2.529
2.459
2.340
2.306
2.219
2.217
2.019
1.995
1.926
1.928
1.901
1.824
1.698
1.576
1.460
1.455
1.399
1.301
1.281
1.171
1.125
1.069
1.005
0.928
0.908
0.899
0.862
0.847
0.753
0.602
0.428
0.418
0.306.
0.255
0.238
0.216
0.196
0.187
0.161
0.155
0.147
0.066
0.049
0.032
-0.019
-0.139
-0.212
-0.332
-0.360
-0.372
-0.537
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Appendix.-Continued.
Central city

State

Index score

El Paso
Worchester
Erie
Toledo
Columbia
Grand Rapids
Oakland
Lancaster
Richmond
Daytona Beach
Huntington
Macon
Springfield
New Orleans
Pittsburgh
Norfolk
Boston
Scranton
Akron
Chicago
Albany
Canton
Gary
York
Binghamton
New Bedford
Cincinnati
Miami
Rochester
Flint
Philadelphia
Bridgeport
Reading
Syracuse
Birmingham
New Brunswick
Johnstown
Louisville
New York
Harrisburg
Baltimore
Trenton
Utica
Providence
Youngstown
Jersey City
Wilmington
New Haven
Saginaw
Dayton
Atlanta
St. Louis
Cleveland
Hartford
Buffalo

Texas
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Ohio
South Carolina
Michigan
California
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Florida
West Virginia
Georgia
Massachusetts
Louisiana
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Illinois
New York
Ohio
Indiana
Pennsy1vania
New York
Massachusetts
Ohio
Florida
New York
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
New York
Alabama
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Kentucky
New York
Pennsylvania
Maryland
New Jersey
New York
Rhode Island
Ohio
New Jersey
Delaware
Connecticut
Michigan
Ohio
Georgia
Missouri
Ohio
Connecticut
New York

-0.596
-0.660
-0.680
-1.005
- 1.214
- 1.338
-1.606
- 1.705
- 1.739
- 1.746
-1.884
- 1.947
-2.130
-2.189
-2.259
-2.335
-2.399
-2.577
-2.705
-2.746
-2.840
-2.847
-2.862
-3.013
-3.148
-3.282
-3.346
-3.492
-3.508
- 3.510
-3.560
-3.645
-3.679
-3.682
-3.762
-3.770
-3.848
-3.986
-4.295
-4.485
-4.558
-4.701
-4.710
-4.731
-4.798
-5.226
-5.446
-5.453
-5.552
-6.025
-6.057
-6.405
-6.517
-6.727
-6.809
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Appendix.-Continued.
Central city

State

Index score

Atlantic City
Paterson
Detroit
Augusta
Newark

New Jersey
New Jersey
Michigan
Georgia
New Jersey

-6.827
-7.058
-7.085
-7.841
-9.154

Notes: The index of urban health is the product of the summation of standardscores for a population of central cities (n = 152) on five indicators of economic
well-being: percentage change in population 1970-80; percentage unemployed
1980; median household income 1980; percentage of persons below the poverty
line 1980; and percentage change in per capita income 1970-80. The scores for
percentage unemployed and percentage of persons below the poverty line are
adjusted (multiplied by negative one) so that a positive score on all indicators
connotes relative economic health.
The emboldened entry constitutes the breaking point between the bottom third
of the cities and the remainder of the them. All cities that are at, or lie below,
the breaking point were designated as 'distressed' and included in the survey
mailing.

